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MUCH ADO ABOUT DUE-ON-SALE: AVOIDING THE
TEMPEST IN NEW YORK
I.

INTRODUCTION

Today's ubiquitous due-on-sale clause,1 either buried in or missing entirely from residential mortgage contracts prior to 1970, has
emerged from obscurity to spark litigation across the country. Heralded as the salvation of lenders and the nemesis of borrowers, the
due-on-sale issue is central to today's rapidly evolving era of banking
and real estate law. The issue of the clause's validity and enforceability has been the subject of numerous cases in both state
and federal3 jurisdictions. State and federal5 legislatures have introduced bills seeking to limit or uphold its enforceability. The picture
is further complicated by the diverse practices and procedures of
the country's dual banking system 6 and the various regulatory agen1. A due-on-sale clause, used in real property security transactions such as home mortgages, provides for acceleration of the loan principal, at the option of the lender, in the event
of transfer, sale or further encumbrance of the property. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 295 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as G. OSBORNE];
see infra note 10 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379 (1978); cases cited infra notes 67-70.
3. See, e.g., Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Arlington, 651 F.2d 910 (4th
Cir. 1981); cases cited infra notes 147-49, 153.
4. See infra notes 79-99 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 158-91 and accompanying text.
6. The dual banking system refers to the regulatory structure of the lending institutions
which may be regulated by both state and federal agencies. For example, savings and loan
associations may be either state or federally chartered. G. OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 641. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), an independent agency established under the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 12 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (1976), has authority to charter and
regulate the federal savings and loans (FS&Ls) under the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933
(HOLA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-70 (1976). The state chartered savings and loan associations
(SS&Ls) are partially controlled by the FHLBB by virtue of the state associations' membership in such federal insurance programs as the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). G. OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 641. SS&Ls are, however, under the authority of
state banking boards, which control their lending and operational activities. This dual system
"produces some interesting and arguably irrational distinctions" in the permissible activities of
the associations. Id. at 642. For example, prior to 1979, FS&Ls were not permitted, under
FHLBB regulations, to make variable rate mortgages while a number of state-chartered institutions could do so. Id. In fact, when FS&Ls were authorized to make adjustable rate mortgages, the New York Banking Department took emergency action to give state-chartered insti-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:1229

cieS7 which supervise the functioning of the lending institutions in
the area of residential loan financing.
The spirited controversy about the due-on-sale clause in mortgage contracts is a natural by-product of the economic conditions
which affect both borrowers and lenders in today's money market.
With interest rates towering at unprecedented levels8 and inflation
substantially raising the prices of homes, 9 the average consumer is
more aware than ever of the intricacies and issues involved in mortgage financing. Likewise, lenders are finding it increasingly necessary to protect their loan portfolios by employing options, such as
enforcement of the due-on-sale clause, which allow them to reassess
the return rate on their investments. The due-on-sale provision in the
mortgage loan contract typically provides that if the subject property
is sold, conveyed, transferred or otherwise alienated from the original owner, without the prior consent of the lender, the lender
reserves the right to accelerate the remaining balance of the loan as
tutions authority to do so to ensure equal competition. [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA)
No. 33, at B-5 (Aug. 17, 1981).
Regulation of commercial banks, both state and federal, is more complex than that of the
savings and loan associations or mutual savings banks. G. OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 642.
Commercial banks' more diverse activities are supervised by several federal agencies in addition to their home state's banking boards and regulations. Id. at 643. Federally chartered
commercial banks (called "national banks") are governed by the Federal Reserve Board and
the rules and interpretations issued by the United States Treasury, Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC). Id. Those state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve system are also governed by the Federal Reserve Board. Id. Those state banks that
are not members may still have their deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
(FDIC) which also insures and supervises national banks. Id. The real estate lending activities
of state-chartered commercial banks, however, are subject only to regulation by their state
banking boards and state law. Id. at 644. Despite the greater complexity of the commercial
banks' regulatory scheme, both state and federal commercial banks are usually able to exercise
greater discretion in real estate lending than the savings and loan associations. Id.
Mutual savings banks are exclusively state-chartered, but exist in only eighteen states.
Their lending activities extend to commercial and residential mortgage loans. They are regulated by the state's banking board but also subject to the applicable FHLBB's regulations if
their deposits are insured by the FSLIC. Id.
7. See supra note 6.
8. In July 1981, the FHLBB reported that the conventional home loan mortgage interest
rate hit a record high of 16.75% in June 1981; a year earlier the average closing rate on loans
was 13.14%. [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 28, at A-I (July 13, 1981). In contrast,
in 1976-77, the rate remained under 9%. 66 Fed. Res. Bull. A40 (Sept. 1980) (Table 1.55:
"Mortgage Markets"). The rate rose to above 11% in 1979. 68 Fed. Res. Bull. A40 (Feb.
1982) (Table 1.54: "Mortgage Markets").
9. The average purchase price of a new home in 1981 was $90,000. In 1979, it was
$74,400. 68 Fed. Res. Bull. A40 (Feb. 1982) (Table 1.54: "Mortgage Markets"). In 1976, the
new home purchase price was $48,400. 66 Fed. Res. Bull. A40 (Sept. 1980) (Table 1.55:
"Mortgage Markets").
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immediately due and payable.' 0 Lenders may also use a due-on-encumbrance clause which accelerates the debt in the event the mortgaged real estate is subsequently encumbered by a junior lien or secondary mortgage. 1
The consumer battle against the enforceability of the due-onsale clause has raged ever since interest rates rose high enough to

scare off prospective home buyers.' 2 A mortgage contract which does
not contain a due-on-sale provision can represent an attractive
financing arrangement for a prospective purchaser which the seller
can parlay into extra cash, upon sale of the home, by raising the
purchase price to reflect this added feature.' 3 By preventing the

10. For example, the due-on-sale clause in the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA)/Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) form provides: "If all or any
part of the property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by borrower without Lender's
prior written consent. . . Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums secured by this
Mortgage to be immediately due and payable." FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Instrument 6175,
para.1 7, quoted in O'Connell, The Due-On-Sale Clause in Florida:A PotentialBattleground
for Borrowers and Lenders, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 933, 934 n.9 (1979).
A due-on-encumbrance clause is a variation of the due-on-sale clause, which provides specifically for acceleration in the event the borrower should "dispose of or further encumber said
property, or any part thereof, or any interest therein. .. .." See LaSala v. American Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 869, 489 P.2d 1113, 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851 (1971).
Some mortgages also contain a provision to allow the lender to collect a prepayment
charge if the borrower prepays the loan, either as a result of an acceleration clause or to
refinance if interest rates fall. See Comment, Debtor-Selection Provisions Found in Trust
Deeds and the Extent of Their Enforceability in the Courts, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 475, 475 n.2
(1962).
11. See supra note 10.
12. The residential mortgage rate in New York (Nassau County) in November 1981
was 17.5%. In addition, there was a 3-point loan servicing fee-a one-time charge based on 3%
of the borrowed principal. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1981, (Long Island Section), at 33, col. 1; see
supra note 8. The problem can be illustrated by examining a typical residential real estate
transaction: In 1970, A buys a home for $60,000 with a $10,000 down payment, securing a
loan for $50,000 from a lending institution at eight percent interest for a thirty-year term.
Assume mortgage interest rates remain relatively stable over the next five years and, in 1975,
A sells her home to a purchaser, B, for $80,000. A's mortgage contract, with its remaining
twenty-five-year term, has an enforceable due-on-sale clause which allows the lender to accelerate the principal at the time of sale. Alternatively, the lender can waive the acceleration in
exchange for a renegotiated rate of interest on the mortgage assumed by B. This due-on-sale
clause effectively prevents A from selling her home and her interest rate of eight percent to B.
If the lender refuses to allow transfer at the old rate, B has to obtain a new loan, with either
the same or a different lender, at the prevailing market rate. If the interest rate change is
minor, neither A nor B contests the enforceability of the due-on-sale clause or its effect on the
transaction. If the sale takes place in 1981, however, the change to the prevailing market rate
could result in a significant increase in the monthly interest payments which B must make to
the lender thereby dramatically increasing B's overall costs. This situation could preclude B's
purchase of the property, increasing A's interest in litigating to avoid the lender's enforcement
of the clause.
13. The purchaser of an assumable mortgage may pay a premium of five to ten percent
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transfer of the old interest rate to the new buyer, however, the lender
has the power to use the due-on-sale clause as an interest-increasing
device for its loan portfolio1 4 during periods of volatile interest rates.

The use of the due-on-sale clause by the lender to protect mortgage loan portfolios through maximization of interest rates on transferred loans is well known in the mortgage lending industry.1 5 Judicial review of the clause, however, tends to focus primarily on its use
as a device to protect against impairment of the lender's security.16
While security protection should not be ignored, the courts' focus on
this single justification has contributed to the demise of the due-onsale clause in circumstances where the lender, under the imposed
burden of proof, is unable to demonstrate a threat to security sufficient for the courts to sanction its use."
The issue of the due-on-sale clause's enforceability is important
to the national mortgage market s because the cost of a home represents a significant outlay for the average homeowner.? Likewise, private institutional lenders, which include commercial banks, mutual
savings banks, state-chartered savings and loan associations
(SS&Ls), and federally chartered savings and loan associations
above the purchase price of a comparable home without assumable financing. This represents a
windfall to the seller that is subsidized by new borrowers paying higher rates and represents a
loss to those who invest in lending institutions. Letter from Robert L. Kemper, Pres., California Bankers Association to Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, D.C. (Nov.
25, 1981) (commenting on the proposed rule for national banks regarding due-on-sale clauses)
(copy on file in office of Hofstra Law Review); see infra text accompanying notes 146-56.
14. The due-on-sale clause is not self-executing but allows the lender the option to accelerate, within a reasonable time following transfer, or to waive the option in exchange for the
payment of transfer fees or an increased interest rate. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 304, 509 P.2d 1240, 1246 (1973) (one month is reasonable, but
not one year); Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank,

-

Mass. _,

_,

423 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (1981)

(three months after transfer not unreasonable delay before acceleration, but "once the bank
knows or should have known of the transfer, any delay is at its peril").
15. For a discussion of the original purpose and use of the due-on-sale clause, see
Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alentation Doctrine to Real Property SecurIty Interests, 58 IowA L. REV. 747, 769-70 (1973). But see Bartke & Tagaropulos, Michigan's Looking Glass World of Due-on-Sale Clauses, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 971, 979 (1978).
16. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 951-52, 582 P.2d 970, 973,
148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 382 (1978); infra cases cited note 68.
17. Comment, supra note 10, at 482.
18. As of the first quarter of 1981, almost 973 trillion dollars in outstanding mortgage
debt was secured by one-to-four family homes. 67 Fed. Res. Bull. A39 (Aug. 1981) (Table
1.55: "Mortgage Debt Outstanding").
19. "At today's mortgage rates, the typical family needs an income of $38,520 to afford
a median-priced new home." Remarks of Richard Pratt, Chairman of FHLBB, quoted in 14
FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD. J., Apr. 1981, at 9 (Annual Report 1980).
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(FS&Ls), have a huge stake in the mortgage market.2 0 Because savings and loans associations are the major source of residential loan
financing, 1 their interest in the controversy is considerable and, in
fact, substantial litigation of the issue has involved savings and loan
22
associations' use of the due-on-sale clause.
This note assesses the current state of the law nationally as to
the validity of the due-on-sale clause in residential and commercial
loan contracts with some focus on the California case law that has
precipitated or influenced litigation in other states. The note examines the federal attempt to preempt contrary state law on the subject
of due-on-sale clauses and develops a rationale for their continued
use in loan financing agreements in light of recent changes in national banking and loan financing regulations. Finally, the note explores the status of the due-on-sale clause in New York mortgage
instruments and proposes a more definite judicial and legislative
endorsement.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE DUE-ON-SALE CONTROVERSY

A.

The CaliforniaInfluence

The California Supreme Court's now famous Wellenkamp v.
Bank of America23 decision, which limited state lenders' enforcement of due-on-sale clauses, evolved from an earlier line of California cases that first sanctioned the use of the clause. In Coast Bank v.
Minderhout4 the California court allowed an institutional lender to
enforce a loan provision that restricted the borrower's right to encumber certain real estate used as security for the loan until the indebtedness was paid.2 5 The court concluded that it was not an unreasonable restraint on alienation,'26 and consequently not in violation of
a California common-law rule that prohibits invalid restraints on
alienation,' 7 for the bank to condition its continued credit on the bor20. Almost 75% of the mortgage debt is held by private institutional lenders which include: savings and loan associations, 36.5%; commercial banks, 16.7%; life insurance companies, 10.3%; and mutual savings banks, 9.2%. G. OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 638-39.
21. Id. at 639.
22. See infra cases cited notes 120-57 and accompanying text.
23. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
24. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), overruled in part, Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
25. 61 Cal. 2d at 313, 392 P.2d at 266, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (1964).
26. Id. at 316-17, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (emphasis added).
27. Id. This common law rule is codified in the California Civil Code: "Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void." Id. at 316 n.3, 392 P.2d
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rower's agreement not to encumber or transfer the property. The
court, in effect, gave its blessing to the due-on-sale or encumbrance
arrangement, noting that certain restraints were reasonable when
"designed to protect justifiable interests of the parties. ' 8
Following this decision, the lender's use of the due-on-sale
clause received appellate court endorsement in Hellbaum v. Lytton
Savings & Loan Association of Northern California2" and Cherry v.
0 In Cherry, the court noted the
Home Savings & Loan Association."
lender's use of the due-on-sale clause to defend against the risk of an
unreliable new purchaser and also commented favorably on the use
of the clause as a device to increase interest rates upon transfer:
When interest rates are high, a lender runs the risk they will drop
and that the borrower will refinance his debt elsewhere ....
[W]hen money is loaned at low interest, the lender risks losing the
benefit of a later increase in rates. [A] due-on-sale clause is employed

. .

so that he may take advantage of rising interest rates

in the event his borrower transfers the security. This is merely one
example of ways taken to minimize risks by sensible lenders.
There is no inequity visible from such a provision.31
Following Cherry, however, the California Supreme Court progressively restricted the use of due-on-sale clauses in lending instruments. In LaSala v. American Savings & Loan Association,"2 the
court, in a class action suit, considered a bank's use of a due-onencumbrance clause in its mortgage instruments. The bank sought to
enforce the clause against co-plaintiffs who had each borrowed
money, secured by second mortgages on their homes, from a private
lender.33 The bank agreed to waive their option to accelerate the
mortgage principal if the homeowners agreed to a $50 and $150 fee,
respectively, and an interest rate increase on the outstanding loan
principal.34 The court acknowledged that protection of the lender's
at 268 n.3, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508 n.3 (citing CAL. CiV. CODE § 711 (West 1954)).
28. Id. at 316, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
29. 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969) (lender's right to accelerate loan upon

sale of the property was not an unlawful restraint upon alienation even when combined with
lender's right to impose a prepayment penalty on the borrower), disapproved, Wellenkamp v.
Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
30. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969), disapproved Wellenkamp v. Bank

of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
31.
32.
33.
34.

276 Cal. App. 2d at 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
Id. at 868-69, 489 P.2d at 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
Id. at 870, 489 P.2d at 1116, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
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security justified automatic enforcement of due-on-sale clauses because the sale of property divests the original borrower of any interest in the property and the shift in responsibility for the property's
upkeep could increase the lender's risk.3 5 The court refused enforcement of the due-on-encumbrance clause, however, because the junior
encumbrance did not divest the owner's interest or increase the
lender's risk.
Balancing the clause's restraining effect on alienation against
the degree of risk to the lender, the LaSala court held that the use
of the clause unlawfully restrains alienation whenever the junior encumbrance does not endanger the lender's security.3 6 The court did
not feel constrained by the earlier decisions in Coast Bank and
Hellbaum, noting that the discussion of due-on-encumbrance clauses
by those courts was dicta.
The LaSala balance of interests approach was broadened in
Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association." Declining to uphold
a due-on-sale clause in a land installment sale, the court held that
allowing the lender to accelerate the loan would unreasonably restrain the sale.39 The court reasoned that the borrower-seller in an
installment contract, normally receives only a fraction of the
purchase price at the time of transfer and, therefore, would not have
the means to pay the lender the outstanding debt. The installment
sale thus differs markedly from an outright sale where the entire
price is paid upon transfer. Moreover, the risk to the lender is considerably lessened under an installment sale since the borrower retains legal title and thus has an incentive to maintain the property's
value until the full price is paid.40 The Tucker court examined the
practical effect upon alienation-the "quantum of restraint"-that
would result from enforcement of the due-on-sale clause. 41 It concluded that the clause could only be validly enforced if the lender
demonstrated a sufficient threat to justify the considerable restraint
35. Id. at 880, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
36. Id. at 877, 489 P.2d at 1121, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 857. The court did recognize, however, that a junior lien could, under certain circumstances, justify acceleration. The key element in the situations listed by the court was that the borrower's remaining interest did not
provide sufficient incentive to avoid waste or depreciation. Comment, Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America: A Victory for the Consumer? 31 HASINGs L.J. 275, 279 (1979).
37. LaSala, 5 Cal. 3d at 879, 489 P.2d at 1122, 97 Cal Rptr. at 858.
38. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
39. Id. at 637-38, 526 P.2d at 1174-75, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 636, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
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and held that, under the facts, the lender had not done so."2 The
court also rejected the argument that increasing the lender's interest
rate justified the clause's enforcement in an installment sale, but
added that it did not address whatever "cogency [the] argument
[might] retain concerning the relatively mild restraint involved in
43
the case of an outright sale."
Tucker and LaSala clearly evidenced an erosion of the automatic application of due-on clauses. This trend was advanced by the
application of these principles in the California Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America." In Wellenkamp, the plaintiff had agreed to purchase residential property
and to assume the seller's loan obligation. The loan agreement contained a standard due-on-sale clause which the lender agreed to
waive in exchange for a 11/4% increase in the loan's annual interest
rate. The plaintiff refused this demand and sought an injunction
against the lender's enforcement of the clause and a declaration that,
since the lender's security was not imperiled by the sale, enforcement
of the clause constituted an unreasonable restraint on alienation. 45
The Wellenkamp court determined that a restraint asserted by
a due-on-sale clause had a prohibitive effect on the property sale
where the lender's potential refusal to allow assumption of the old
interest rate in a tight money market would result in the buyer's
inability to secure new financing. Likewise, if the lender only agreed
to the loan assumption at an increased rate, the sale could still be
inhibited by the buyer's demand that the seller lower the purchase
price or forego the sale. In either case, according to the court, there
resulted a clear restraint on alienation4 6 that outweighed the purported justification for enforcement of the clause.47 The court concluded that outright sale of the property did not necessarily increase
the lender's risk that waste or default would occur when the new
buyer could be as financially sound as the original borrower, if not
42. Id. at 639-40, 526 P.2d at 1175-76, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40. The court did note,
however, that a due-on-sale clause could be enforced in an installment sale context if a legiti-

mate threat was shown, i.e., if the lender demonstrated that the conduct of the party in possession under the land contract would cause waste or depreciation or increase the likelihood of
default. Id. at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 639 n.10, 526 P.2d at 1175-76 n.10, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40 n.10.
21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
Id. at 946-47, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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more so. 8 This reasoning represented a departure from LaSala and
Tucker where the distinction that seller retained title was determinative as a measure of the risk.4
Wellenkamp also specifically rejected the argument that protection of the lender's mortgage portfolio warranted the rate increase
given the quantum of restraint imposed on the seller. In fact, the
court took the position that the use of the due-on-sale clause was an
unjust attempt by the lender to transfer onto the borrower the economic risks of an inflationary economy. 0 Justice Clark, the lone dissenter, suggested that the restraint on alienation effect did not result
from the due-on-sale clause, but rather from the inflationary economy's tight money market.5 1 He also criticized the majority's failure
to recognize that "lenders and borrowers

. . .

and prospective own-

ers, should be allowed to run their own affairs with minimal governmental intrusion-particularly from [the judiciary] 52 and predicted
that such interference would hinder the availability of mortgage
funds for the next generation of borrowers. 5 Despite his vigorous
dissent, the Wellenkamp decision "mark[ed] the end of a ten year
transition in California law from automatic enforcement to limited
enforcement of the due-on-sale clause," 5' and virtually redesigned
the traditional supply-demand model that regulates the economics of
55
the home financing market.

Six months later, in Medovoi v. American Savings & Loan Association,58 Wellenkamp's dissenting view was reiterated by the ma48. Id.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 32-43.
50. "Lenders . . . take into account their projections of future economic conditions
when they initially determine the rate of payment and the interest on these long-term
loans. . . .We believe, however, that it would be unjust to place the burden of the lender's
mistaken economic projections on property owners.
21 Cal. 3d at 952-53, 582 P.2d at
976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
51. Id. at 956, 582 P.2d at 978, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (Clark, J.,dissenting).
52. Id. at 958, 582 P.2d at 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (Clark, J.,dissenting).
53. Id. at 954, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (Clark, J.,dissenting).
54. O'Connell, supra note 10, at 943.
55. For a discussion of the economic impact resulting from restriction of the due-on.sale
clause's use, see infra text accompanying notes 206-41. See generally Finch, Due-On-Sale
Clauses in Debt Instruments: Reconciling Legal Doctrine and Market Realities, 98 BANKING
L.J. 300 (1981).
For the point of view that the Wellenkamp rejection of the lender's justification of due-onsale enforcement represents a reasonable balancing of the parties' interests, see Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: Exercise of Due-on-Sale Clauses as an Unreasonable Restraint
Upon Alienation, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv.722-33 (1979). But see Comment, supra note 10 (view
of Wellenkamp decision from lender's perspective).
56. 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1979). In denying a hearing, the California
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jority57 and concurring" opinions in a California District Court of
Appeals decision where the second district court allowed enforcement of a due-on-sale clause involving business property.59 The court
construed the Wellenkamp restriction as expressly limited, not only
to institutional lenders, but also to the voluntary transfer of owneroccupied residential property.60
Following this, however, the fourth district appellate court in
California expanded the scope61 of Wellenkamp to include private
lenders. In Wilhite v. Callihan,e2 the court observed that the issue of
whether a property transfer impaired the lender's security was not
determined by the lender's status as an institutional or private
lender,63 and held that the lenders, in this case, had not met their
burden of justifying enforcement of the due-on-sale clause." This
application of the Wellenkamp rule was recently affirmed by the
California Supreme Court when, in a similar case, it reversed an
appellate court ruling that had exempted private lenders from the
burden of proving security impairment before enforcing a due-onSupreme Court ordered that the opinion not be officially published. Id.
57. Id. at 583 n.1.
58. 152 Cal. Rptr. at 584 (Thompson, J., concurring).
59. The property was a multiple-residence apartment building and had been the subject
of transfer as a result of a foreclosure sale by the holder of the second mortgage. Id. at 576-77.
60. The court referred to the sale of commercial property involving a business transaction as substantially different from the sale of a family residence which had been singled out
for special protection by the legislature and concluded that automatic enforcement of a contractual due-on-sale clause, in the context of the facts, did not constitute a restraint on alienation. Id. at 581.
61. See Wellenkamp, 21 Cal. 3d at 952 n.9, 582 P.2d at 976 n.9, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385
n.9 (expressly limiting holding to institutional lenders). The lender in Wellenkamp was a statechartered lender, id., as were all the lenders in cases discussed thus far.
62. 121 Cal. App. 3d 661, 175 Cal. Rptr. 507 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1981). The Callihans,
private individual lenders, made a cash loan in exchange for a second deed of trust encumbering the borrowers' residence. The balance due at the time of the default was $2,133.
63. Id. at 667, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
64. The court, adopting the findings of the trial court, reasoned that the debt owed to
the lender was nominal compared to the appreciated value of the house and that the new
owner was more creditworthy than the former. Id. at 665, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 510; cf.Garber v.
Fullerton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 122 Cal. App. 3d 423, 176 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981) (allowing
enforcement of due-on-sale clause against buyer who purchased home through tax lien sale).
While the Garber court recognized the lack of risk to the lender's security, it concluded that
the quantum of restraint imposed was minimal on an involuntary tax lien sale, when the purchaser has no consensual relationship to either the lender or the original borrower and, therefore, no reasonable expectation to have "his purchase financed at a rate of interest grossly
below the market rate." Id. at 428, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 53. Had the original borrower sought to
sell the property before the tax lien foreclosure, however, he would have had the benefit of the
Wellenkamp rule to better realize his equity in the home. Id. at 427 n.2, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 52
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sale clause.6 5
B.

Other Jurisdictions'Approaches to Due-On-Sale

While no state has challenged the fundamental validity of dueon-sale clauses,66 others besides California have limited their enforceability. The rationales adopted by the limiting jurisdictions view
the due-on-sale clause as either an unreasonable restraint on alienation under the circumstances 67 or as justified only if the lender
proves that the security is at risk."8
Other jurisdictions uphold the general validity of the due-onsale clause as a legitimate contractual provision absent some underlying fraud or inequity.6 9 Certain jurisdictions specifically recognize
the use of the clause as a valid market device for the increase of
interest rates, 70 especially when the loan contract gives the borrower
the right to prepay the loan without penalty. 1
65. Dawn Inv. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cty., 30 Cal. 3d 695, 639 P.2d 974,
180 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1982) (private purchase money lenders secured by second deed of trust on
commercial property not entitled to enforcement of due-on-sale clause), rev'g 116 Cal. App.
3d, 172 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1981).
66. Comment, Mortgages-A Catalogue and Critique on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement of Modern-Day Due-On-Sale Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REV. 485, 497 (1973). The author reported a 1971 Utah trial court opinion which held the clause invalid as against public
policy. This was said to be erroneous, however, by the Utah Supreme Court which affirmed on
other grounds. Id. at 497 n.49.
67. See, e.g., Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250
N.W.2d 804 (1977) (due-on-sale clause in mortgage was unreasonable restraint on alienation
where sole basis for enforcement was lender's interest in maintaining its mortgage portfolio at
current interest rates). See generally Volkmer, supra note 15.
68. See, e.g., Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Phoenix, 118 Ariz. 473, 578
P.2d 152 (1978); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725
(1972); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App. 1970); State v. Valley Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 97 N.M. 8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981); Terry v. Born, 24 Wash. App. 652, 604 P.2d 504
(1979).
69. See, e.g., Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979); Baker v. Loves Park Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975); Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco
Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980); First Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes,
92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976); Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 N.H. 722,
433 A.2d 1312 (1981); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d
580 (1976); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. App. 1981).
70. See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d
1240 (1973); Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d
558 (1976); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
The rationale used by these courts has been referred to as the "money market rationale"
which "recognizes the need of lenders to maintain their loan portfolios at current rates of
interest." Finch, supra note 55, at 306.
71. Malouffv. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973);
Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank, Mass. -,
423 N.E.2d 998 (1981).
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The myriad factual situations preclude generalization as to the
due-on-sale clauses' validity in any one jurisdiction, but reference
has been made to those which are either "consumer oriented"7 2 or
"lender oriented, 7 3 the classification depending on which party
bears the burden of proof.74 Lender oriented jurisdictions (the plurality view) regard the clause as presumptively valid,75 while the
consumer oriented states require the lender to demonstrate affirmatively some security risk resulting from the transfer.76 Likewise, although a jurisdiction may fall into a lender oriented category, courts
do not hesitate to disallow enforcement when such enforcement
would be inequitable.7 7 All that is clear is that the special facts of
each decision must be carefully examined to forecast the policy that
will likely apply to a new set of facts. 8
C. State Legislation on Due-On-Sale
Several state legislatures have enacted laws restricting the enforceability of the due-on-sale clause. 9 One such law, enacted in
72. Bartke & Tagaropulos, supra note 15, at 989-90.
73. Id. at 985-89.
74. Id. at 985.
75. Id. at 985-86. Cases in these jurisdictions generally cite, or their rationale can be
traced back to, the early California cases which upheld the due-on-sale clause's general validity. See authorities cited supra notes 24-31; see also Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3d 713, 727-31 (1976
& Supp. 1981) (discussing due-on-sale cases).
76. Bartke & Tagaropulos, supra note 15, at 989-90.
77. E.g., Silver v. Rochester Say. Bank, 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (4th Dep't
1980); Nichols v. Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. 1978).
78. Compare Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d
546 (1976) (allowing lender increase in interest upon transfer where there was specific provision in loan contract to the effect that "[any transfer] shall be deemed to increase the risk of
lender, and lender . . . may declare the entire balance immediately due . . . or at its sole
option may consent to said change in title or occupancy and may increase the rate of said loan
not to exceed two percent per annum to compensate for such increased risk." 86 Wash. 2d at
402, 545 P.2d at 547 (italics omitted)) with Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1976) (permitting due-on-sale acceleration
of commercial mortgage only after lender satisfied burden of proof as to threat to security)
and Terry v. Born, 24 Wash. App. 652, 604 P.2d 504 (1979) (disallowing cancellation of
installment land contract which prohibited both transfer of property and prepayment of debt
where there was no threat to lender's security and where buyer's forfeiture would result in loss
of initial investment and appreciation value). For a discussion of authorities cited and due-onsale enforceability in Washington see Finch, supra note 55, at 315-17.
79. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.8(2)(c) (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
24-10(d) (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-7-1 to -14 (Supp. 1982). The Iowa statute
renders void any provision of a residential loan contract that purports to prohibit transfer or to
change the interest rate unless the security of the lender is impaired. The statute's annotation
cites an opinion by the state attorney general that recognizes the conflict with federal regulations and acknowledges the preemptive effect of the federal law. Op. Atty. Gen. Pope, Jan. 4,
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Colorado in 197580 and applicable to instruments executed after that
date,"' prohibits acceleration by the lender unless the new or prospective purchaser is financially unsound. 2 No transfer fees may be,
exacted greater than one-half of one percent of the outstanding principal s and the interest rate may be increased only to a maximum of
one percent above the existing rate.8 The statute, however, is not
applicable to commercial property, including multifamily housing
projects,8 5 nor to lenders not regularly engaged in the business of
real estate loans,86 i.e. purchase money seller-lenders. Due-on-sale
clauses in loans executed prior to 1975, however, regardless of when
they are transferred, have been upheld by the Colorado court.
Moreover, in 1980, the Colorado voters rejected a proposed amendment to the state constitution"8 which would have prohibited due-onsale acceleration by any lender, absent substantial threat to the se1980, cited in IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.8(2)(c), at 24 (West Supp. 1982-1983) (annotation).
The New Mexico statute, enacted March 1981, prohibits due-on-sale clauses in residential
mortgages unless the security would be substantially impaired by the transfer. It has been held
to apply to loans made prior to the law's effective date but assumed after that date. State v.
Valley Say. & Loan Ass'n, N.M. _ 636 P.2d 279 (1981). The North Carolina statute,
amended in 1981, limits an assumption fee to $175 when the original borrower is released
from liability and to $100 if the borrower is not released. For a discussion of the 1971 version
of this statute and the holding in Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224
S.E.2d 580 (1976) (upholding right of lender to increase rates upon transfer of commercial
property where there were no prepayment penalties), see Note, Real Property Security-North Carolina Deals Mortgagors a Bad Hand, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 490, 502-05
(1977).
80. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-30-165(1)-(5) (Supp. 1980).
81. Id. § 38-30-165(1)(d).
82. Id. § 38-30-165(1)(a).
83. Id. § 38-30-165(1)(c).
84. Id. § 38-30-165(1)(b).
85. Id. § 38-30-165(3), (4) (the exclusion is for HUD lenders who mature the indebtedness on housing projects pursuant to the current regulation of the federal housing administration (FHA)).
86. Id. § 38-30-165(5).
87. Von Ehrenkrook v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 196 Colo. 179, 585 P.2d 589
(1978) (allowing interest increase from 53% to 9 /% upon 1975 assumption of deed of trust
because it was executed in 1963). Accord Krause v. Columbia Say. & Loan Ass'n, Colo.
App. ..., 631 P.2d 1158 (1981),pet.for review granted, -. Colo. ., 631 P.2d 1158 (1981)
(due-on-sale upheld as to 1972 deed of trust secured by commercial property and transferred
by installment contract); Bakker v. Empire Say., Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 634 P.2d 1021 (Colo.
App. 1981), pet.for review granted,Colo. _ 634 P.2d 1021 (1981) (due-on-sale foreclosure upheld as to 1969 deed of trust transferred by installment contract).
88. Freeman & Roberts, Due-On-Sale Clauses: Reasonable Restraints?, 17 TRIAL, Apr.
1981, at 34, 35. The defeated amendment is quoted in Guerin, Selected Problems in WrapAround Financing:Suggested Approaches to Due-On-Sale Clauses and PurchasersDepreciable Basis, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 401, 426 n.70 (1981).
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curity, if the original borrowers remained liable on the note.
Utah, in 1981, passed a law that flatly prohibits the use of a
due-on-sale clause in residential loans unless the lender proves that a
transfer would substantially impair the lender's interest.8 9 The statute is applicable to all mortgage agreements, including those in effect prior to the statute's effective date.90 There are exceptions for
lenders who are not in the business of making loans,9 1 and for the
use of the clause in loans sold to federal agencies in the secondary
mortgage market. 2
States that have no specific due-on-sale legislation have used
other laws to support their particular policy on this issue. 3 Some
restrict the lender's right to impose prepayment fees, or restrict the
amount of the fee particularly if a due-on-sale acceleration or an
interest increase is permitted. 9 4 In Michigan, the state attorney general has ordered the state's FS&Ls to stop enforcing the clause or
face civil penalties, contending that their use of the clause violates
the state's Consumer Protection Act. 95 As a result, the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) has brought a suit in federal
court to bar the attorney general's actions and to seek confirmation
of federal preemption of contrary state law.96
A Virginia statute allows lenders the use of a due-on-sale provision as long as it is prominently disclosed to the borrower and no
prepayment fee is collected if the clause is enforced. 9 Minnesota,
which had restricted due-on-sale acceleration, amended its statute
after a state court upheld the clause in a commercial transaction.98
As of 1981, the liberalized statute allows an interest increase, upon
89.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-15-1 to -10 (Supp. 1981).

90.

Id. § 57-15-2.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

E.g., NED. REv. STAT. § 8-355 (Supp. 1981). The statute makes no reference to due-

§

57-15-6.

§ 57-15-8.5.

on-sale clauses but grants all lending institutions incorporated under the laws of Nebraska "all
rights, powers, privileges, benefits and immunities which may be exercised as of August 30,
1981 by a federal savings and loan association doing business in Nebraska." Id.
94. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 535.9(2) (West Supp. 1982-1983); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 438.31c(2)(c) (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10(b) (Supp.
1981); S.C. CODE § 34-31-90(2) (Supp. 1981).
95. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445-901 to -903 (West Supp. 1982-1983). See [JulyDec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 32, at B-3 (Aug. 10, 1981).
96. FHLBB v. Kelly, reported in [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 32, at B-3

(Aug. 10, 1981).
97.
98.

VA. CODE §§ 6.1-330.33 to -330.34 (1950).
Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn.

1981).
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transfer of residential property, to the existing market rate.'9
III.

THE FEDERAL POSITION AND THE PREEMPTION
CONTROVERSY

Many state judicial decisions regarding the due-on-sale clause

have involved not only state chartered lending institutions but feder-

ally regulated lenders as well. " 0 This has complicated the controversy in states that have restricted the clause's enforceability either

by case law101 or statute,10 2 since such a position is contrary to that
asserted by the FHLBB, the federal agency that governs the federal

lenders. In fact, the FS&Ls use a uniform mortgage instrument 08
which contains a due-on-sale clause.

Although the FS&Ls are not required to insert due-on-sale
clauses in their contracts, they have the power to do so, and the

FHLBB has issued formal regulations on this topic. Promulgated in
June 1976 and effective as to all borrower-occupied residential mortgages made by FS&Ls after July 1976,104 these regulations allow
99. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.20 subd. 6-6a (West Supp. 1982).
100. See supra notes 6, 67-70.
101. See supra cases cited notes 67-68.
102. See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 10.
104. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(d)-(g) (1977). The section has been amended and is now
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f)-(g) (1981):
(f) Due-on-sale clauses. An association continues to have the power to include,
as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instrument whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable sums secured by the association's security instrument if all or any part of the
real property securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the
association's prior written consent. Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section with respect to loans made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home
occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, exercise by the association of such
option (hereafter called a due-on-sale clause) shall be exclusively governed by the
terms of the loan contract, and all rights and remedies of the association and borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract.
(g) Limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses. With respect to any
loan made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occupied or to be occupied
by the borrower, a Federal association: (1) Shall not exercise a due-on-sale clause
because of (i) creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the association's security instrument, (ii) creation of a purchase money security interest for
household appliances; (iii) transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the
death of a joint tenant; or (iv) granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less
not containing an option to purchase; (2) shall not impose a prepayment charge or
equivalent fee for acceleration of the loan by exercise of a due-on-sale clause; and
(3) waives its option to exercise a due-on-sale clause as to a specific transfer, if,
before the transfer the association and the person to whom the property is to be sold
or transferred (the existing borrower's successor in interest) agree in writing that
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FS&Ls to include, at their option, a provision to declare the remaining loan principal due and payable if the property is transferred or
sold by the borrower without the association's prior written consent. 105 The regulations disallow exercise of the clause where the
property is encumbered by a junior lien,106 or by a purchase money
loan for household appliances, 07 or where the propery is transferred
by devise or descent or to a surviving joint tenant by operation of
law.108 Likewise, if the property owner grants a leasehold interest of
three years or less which does not contain an option to purchase, the
clause cannot be exercised.109 If the clause is used, the association
may not charge the borrower a prepayment fee,110 as otherwise allowed when a borrower voluntarily prepays a loan. "
The regulations also allow the FS&Ls to waive the acceleration
option if the parties (FS&L and new purchaser) agree in writing
that the transferee is a satisfactory credit risk and if the transferee
agrees to pay interest on the loan at a rate the association requests. 1 One section also provides that such agreement shall release
the original borrower from the obligations of the mortgage so that
the transferee has a "new" loan agreement with the lender. "'
the person's credit is satisfactory to the association and that interest on sums secured by the association's security interest will be payable at a rate the association
shall request. Upon such agreement and resultant waiver the association shall release the existing borrower from all obligations under the loan instruments, and the
association is deemed to have made a new loan to the existing borrower's successor
in interest.
105. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1980).
106. Id. § 545.8-3(g)(1)(i).
107. Id. § 545.8-3(g)(1)(ii).
108. Id. § 545.8-3(g)(1)(iii).
109. Id. § 545.8-3(g)(1)(iv).
110. Id. § 545.8-3(g)(2).
111. Id. § 545.8-5(b). This section allows for a prepayment charge on residential loans
when expressly provided for in the contract and up to a maximum amount.
112. Id. § 545.8-3(g)(3). It is not clear, in the situation where the lender waives the
option to exercise a due-on-sale clause and simply transfers the loan with a renegotiated rate,
whether the FS&L could impose a prepayment fee on the original borrower since it was not,
technically, exercising the due-on-sale clause. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11. This
is unlikely under 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(b) (1981) which sets forth the FHLBB's disfavor of prepayment charges on all loans including those made before July 31, 1976.
113. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g)(3) (1981). This section provides an advantage to the seller
in jurisdictions where a transfer or conveyance of the property "subject to" the mortgage does
not affect the underlying obligation of the original borrower to the lender.
If a new purchaser defaults in payments to the lender and the lender exercises his right of
action against the borrower, the borrower does have a right of action against the new purchaser that the property be exhausted first in payment of the debt. G. OSBORNE, supra note I,
at 251-52; see Syracuse Trust Co. v. First Trust & Dep. Co., 141 Misc. 603, 605, 252 N.Y.S.
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In another regulation, added July 3, 1979,114 the FHLBB enu-

merated additional circumstances where the federal associations will
find it appropriate to waive acceleration of the loan. These situations
include "transfer of title to members of the borrower's immediate
family, including a former spouse in connection with a divorce, who
occupy or will occupy the property."'115 The regulations also advise
associations to consider waiving the right to require an interest inclause "in cases of extreme hardship to
crease under a due-on-sale
11 6
borrower.
existing
the
It has been argued that these federal regulations preempt state
law in jurisdictions, like California, where the automatic enforceability of the clause is not permitted. 11 7 As a result, there is presently a
conflict in the California appellate courts"" as to the preemptive effect of the FHLBB's regulations on the Wellenkamp rule.119
A.

The CaliforniaPosition

In June 1981, in Panko v. Pan American Federal Savings &
Loan Association,20 the -California Court of Appeals for the First
District upheld state law in a suit against a FS&L by transferees of
commercial property. The court held that the California rule which
requires a lender's showing of impaired security before enforcing a
due-on-sale clause "[neither] infringes upon [n]or is otherwise incompatible with the regulation or operation of the internal affairs of
federal savings and loan associations. 12 While the court recognized
the FHLBB's unqualified intention to preempt state laws by its regulations and policy, 1 22 it noted the lack of reference to the subject of
850, 854 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
This clause has been described as an attempt to side step the Board's policy not to increase the interest rate during the course of the loan term. See 12 C.F.R. § 541.14(a) (1977).
Since 1980, however the Board has allowed alternative mortgage instruments which allow variation in the interest amount during the loan term. See the new regulations on alternative
mortgage instruments (AMLs) effective May 1981, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981) (to be codified
in 12 C.F.R. Part 545 (1981)).
114. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(c) (1981).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text; see infra note 287.
118. See supra notes 120-44 and accompanying text; see infra note 287.
119. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
120. 119 Cal. App. 3d 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. Ist Dist. 1981), review denied
50 U.S.L.W. 2158 (Cal. Sept. 9, 1981), pet. for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3519 (U.S. Nov. 13,
1981) (No. 81-922).
121. Id. at 923, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
122. Id. at 922, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
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due-on-sale clauses in the Home Owner's Loan Act (HOLA) and
concluded that there was no evidence of "a clear congressional mandate that federal law shall control the subject matter herein.1 123 The
court reasoned that California law merely imposed a more stringent
requirement of threatened lender security before enforcing due-onsale clauses. Quoting from a Minnesota case, the Panko court noted
that federal regulations authorize but do not compel use of the dueon-sale clause. 124 Since California only imposes a more stringent requirement on the use of the clause, the result was not deemed an
"'inevitable collision' between the two regulations. 125 Instead, "the
federal regulation leaves the rights and remedies of the parties intact
under the terms of the loan contract. 1 2 Thus, "enforcement of the
due-on-sale clause rests upon conventional contract and property
principles under state law.11 27 This decision, denied an appeal by the
California Supreme Court, has been appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.1 28

In de La Cuesta v. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association,129 the fourth appellate district in California, following the
123. Id.
124. Id. at 923, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 245 (citing Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981)). The Holiday Acres court upheld the due-onsale clause as not per se unreasonable where the loan contract concerned investment residential
property and no inequities in bargaining were proved. 308 N.W.2d at 484. It held, however,
that federal law regarding due-on-sale clauses did not preempt Minnesota law on the subject.
Id. at 480.
125. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 922, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 245 (citing Florida Avocado Growers v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) for general proposition that federal law preempts state law
when there is collision or impossibility of dual compliance with two schemes of regulation).
126. Id. at 924, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 245. The loan agreement was a standardized form
used by FS&Ls by agreement with FHLMC, a secondary purchaser of mortgages. The court
noted the clause in the agreement which states: "This Deed of Trust shall be governed by the
law of the Jurisdiction in which the property is located." Id. at 925, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 246. See
the discussion regarding the FS&Ls' use of this clause, supra notes 10, 103-16.
127. Id. at 924, 174 Cal Rptr. at 245 (citing Holiday Acres, 308 N.W.2d at 477 (Minn.
1981)).
128. Id. at 916, 174 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1981), review denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 2158 (Cal.
Sept. 9, 1981), pet. for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3519 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1981).
129. 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981), review denied, L.A.D.J., Aug.
25, 1981, at 2, col. 3 (Cal. Aug. 24, 1981), prob. juris noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3591 (U.S. Jan.
26, 1982) (No. 81-750). This case involved three consolidated cases (one involving commercial
property). The appellate court reversed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the
lender, ruling that the FS&L could not exercise the due-on-sale clause without showing risk to
the security and the fact that one deed involved commercial property did not change the result.
121 Cal. App. at 329, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 468. As to the treatment of commercial property
contracts with due-on-sale clauses, see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text; see infra
note 287.
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Panko court's lead and paraphrasing its opinion, also held that the
federal regulations do not override the California law. This decision,
also denied a hearing by the state's high court, has been granted
review by the United States Supreme Court.130
The California trend against preemption, however, did not influence the state's second district appellate court in People v. Glendale
Federal Savings & Loan Association.'3 ' The case was decided on

appeal after remand by a federal district court. 13 2 A unanimous
panel 33 rejected the trial court's notion that it was bound by the
federal district court's ruling in another case, Glendale Federal v.
Fox,"" that had upheld federal preemption only as to FS&L loan
agreements made after June 1976. Instead, the issue was more
broadly defined as whether or not the regulatory power of the
FHLBB is sufficient to preempt state regulation. The court deter-

mined that there was no reason to differentiate between loans made
before June 1976 and those made after the date of the latest federal
regulation. 13 5 After examining the two tests generally applicable to a
preemption analysis, namely (1) whether Congress manifested an express intent to preempt the field or, (2) whether an irreconcilable
conflict exists between the two regulations,'36 the court concluded
that "application of either test to the issue here leads inexorably to
130. 50 U.S.L.W. 3591 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1982) (No. 81-750). The Court's decision could
affect more than 600 similar cases in California courts, including 40 against Fidelity Federal.
[July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 43, at B-1 (Nov. 2, 1981); see infra note 287.
131. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 870, 176 Cal. Rptr. 353 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1981).
132. 475 F. Supp. 728 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The federal district court held that the FS&L's
defense of federal preemption did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction, nor did the
intervention of the FHLBB create jurisdiction. Therefore, no decision on the merits was
reached and the case was remanded to the trial court. See infra text accompanying notes 14557.
133. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 870, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
134. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978), partialsummary judgment madefinal,481 F.
Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd on juris.grounds, [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No.
39, at B-4 (Oct. 5, 1981). The district court held that federal regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 545.61 (f),
(g) (1977), were preemptive as to mortgage instruments made after June 8, 1976. 459
F. Supp. at 910-12. That portion of the claim which sought declaratory relief with regard to
the pre-June 1976 period was stipulated to by the parties. The effect of this decision before its
reversal on jurisdictional grounds, was to allow FS&Ls to enforce due-on-sale clauses in loans
made after June 1976, while state-chartered S&Ls and banks could not do so unless the lender
could show risk to security.
135. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 865, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 355. The FHLBB has construed its
policy and regulations as always granting authority to its associations to use due-on-sale
clauses both before and after the specific provisions were added to its regulations. See infra
notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
136. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 866-67, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
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the conclusion that state law has been effectively preempted. 1 37 The
court reasoned that the Wellenkamp rule is in "direct and unavoidable conflict with the Board's regulation, in that California would
deny enforcement of a contractual clause specifically authorized by
the Board." 13 8
Having recognized the direct conflict, the court restated the issue as simply whether the federal due-on-sale regulation was a valid
exercise of the plenary power bestowed on the FHLBB by Congress.139 It concluded that the very justification for establishing regulatory agencies was to relieve Congress from having to legislate such
"loan details."14 0 In discussing the Wellenkamp decision, the court
noted that even Wellenkamp did not declare the due-on-sale clause
invalid per se, nor did it attempt to bar its enforcement completely.141 Rather, Wellenkamp only intended to limit enforcement
of the clause under market conditions characterized by high interest
rates and tight money which inhibit transfer of property and thereby
increase the clause's restraining effect on alienation.14 2 Declining to
extend the Wellenkamp rule "unnecessarily or give it a status that
ousts federal regulation,' "14 3 the appellate court reversed and reto the trial court for judgment in favor of the
manded the action
14 4
defendant FS&L.
The California appellate courts, therefore, are in conflict as to
the preemptive nature of the FHLBBs regulations on the FS&Ls
137. Id.
138. Id. at 867, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 868, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 356. But see cases cited supra notes 120-29. The
California appellate court notes with disapproval the trial court's interpretation of the lack of
express provision as to such loan details in the FHLBB's enabling statute, 12 U.S.C. §§ 146170 (1976), as evidence of a lack of congressional mandate that federal law was intended to
control such details:
It would seem that if Congress had intended federal savings and loan practices to be
subject to state regulation as to 'loan details', it would have been a simple matter for
it to say just that. Congress' failure to specifically authorize by legislation all of the
various permissible clauses to be used in lending instruments cannot be read logically to indicate such an intent.
122 Cal. App. 3d at 868, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
141. Id. at 869, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
142. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
143. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 870, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 358. See. e.g., People v. Coast Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Cf Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir. 1974) (FHLBB's regulation regarding prepayment
penalty held to be valid exercise of the Board's delegated power and California law in the area:
is inapplicable).
144. 122 Cal. App. 3d at 870, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
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located in that state. Resolution of this controversy must await the
United States Supreme Court's decision on the cases pending its
review.

B.

The JurisdictionalHurdle

The FS&Ls are understandably reluctant to submit to judicial
review in jurisdictions that have previously denied automatic enforcement of due-on-sale clauses.1 45 For this reason, they have exercised their removal options in order to plead their dase to a more
sympathetic federal ear. This action has been frustrated, however, by
jurisdictional problems that have forced the federal courts to remand
most of the cases to the state court arena on grounds that, without
diversity of parties, there is no federal jurisdiction.14 6 Since the cases
removed to federal courts often involve a plaintiff who is a borrower
or transferee seeking either enforcement of a state law or a remedy
under state property law, the federal courts have held that the
FS&Ls' defense of federal preemption is not a federal question
raised on the face of the complaint. 4
Nevertheless, those federal district courts which have determined the merits of the preemption controversy,14 8 despite frequent
dismissal or reversal on jurisdictional grounds, have followed the reasoning in Glendale v. Fox14 9 in favor of preemption of state law. In
145. A number of state courts have already denied FS&Ls automatic enforcement of
the clause, see, e.g., de La Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328,
175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981), review denied, L.A.D.J., Aug. 25, 1981, at 2, col. 3 (Cal. Aug. 24,
1981), prob. juris. noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3591 (U.S. Jan 25, 1982) (No. 81-750); First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n of Englewood v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
146. E.g., Schultz v. Coral Gables Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 505 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.
Fla. 1981) (district court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear case after defendant
FS&L removed to federal court); Smart v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Detroit, 500 F.
Supp. 1147 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over suits
removed from state court by FS&Ls).
147. E.g., Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Philadelphia 657
F.2d 29, 35 (3d Cir. 1981); Schultz v. Coral Gables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 505 F. Supp.
1003, 1008 (S.D. Fla. 1981); cf Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 656 F.2d
1364 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the federal district court did not have removal jurisdiction
of claim to recover interest on escrow funds held by FS&L because the defense of preemption,
taken alone, is not a basis for removal).
148. See, e.g., Price v. Florida Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 524 F. Supp. 175 (M.D. Fla.
1981); Dantus v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Denver, 502 F. Supp. 658 (D. Colo. 1980);
Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, partialsummary judgment made
final 481 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd on juris. grounds, [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN.
REP. (BNA) No. 39, at B-4 (Oct. 5, 1981) (9th Cir. No. 79-3573).
149. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978); see supra text accompanying note 147; see also
Price v. Florida Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 524 F. Supp. 175 (M.D. Fla. 1981) in which Justice
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cases involving loans made or transferred after the FHLBB's June
1976 regulations, 150 the preemption decisions have generally relied
on the apparent conflict between federal and state law. 51 In cases
dealing with pre-June 1976 mortgages, however, the courts have also
upheld federal preemption ostensibly because Congress has occupied
the field via the pervasive nature of federal legislation and
regulations.52

In May 1981, a federal circuit court, retaining jurisdiction due
to the parties' diversity, commented on the preemption issue in Williams v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Arlington.153
The court decided that the due-on-sale clause was enforceable under
Virginia state law because it did not constitute a restraint on alienation.1 54 Hence, the decision allowed the court to avoid the preemption issue.155 While the Williams court noted some potential
problems with the preemption argument because one of the defendant lenders was state chartered and one of the loan agreements was
was authority,
executed before June 1976,156 it recognized that there
157
nevertheless, for the federal preemption defense.
C. Federal Regulation
The FHLBB, from the outset, has been adamant in its position
that federal regulations govern enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in
loans made by federally chartered lending institutions.15 8 The speMelton stated: "At least eight other United States district courts have found state rules concerning due-on-sale clauses have been preempted by the [FHLBB's] regulations with respect
to federal savings and loan institutions, There are no federal court decisions to the contrary."
Id. at 178 (citations omitted).
150. The text of those regulations is set out supra at note 104.
151. See cases cited supra note 148.
152. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Gadsen Cty. v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp.
732, 738 (N.D. Fla. 1981) ("Federal regulation on the subject of due-on-sale clauses is pervasive. It is direct; it is explicit; and it leaves no room for state law on the subject be it harsher or
more lenient.").
153. 651 F.2d 910, 922-23 (4th Cir. 1981). The court had jurisdiction over three consolidated cases: one under diversity of parties, and the others involving a federal question as to
whether the type of transfer of property (a sale of beneficial ownership) constituted a transfer
as contemplated by the federal regulations.
154. Id. at 923-24.
155. Id. at 921-23.
156. Id. at 922.
157. Id.
158. See Advisory Opinion of FHLBB, Resolution No. 75-647 (July 30, 1975), cited in
Dunn & Nowinski, Enforcement of Due-On Transfer Clauses: An Update. 16 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TRusT J. 291, 293 (1981).
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cific provisions added in 1976 and 1979 to its regulations" and policyleo reinforce the Board's position that FS&Ls have the right to
enforce due-on-sale clauses as a legitimate interest-raising device
when necessary. This policy applies to pre- as well as post-1976 loans
as evidenced by the language of the 1976 regulations. The regulations state that federal associations continue to have the power to
include due-on-sale clauses in mortgage contracts. 61 The Board's position is that this policy was codified in 1976 but that the codification
only represents confirmation of a pre-existing policy to allow inclusion of due-on-sale clauses.
The Board has recently reiterated its policy in a final rule
adopted July 23, 1981,162 which reasserted the preemptive nature of
the regulations "in order to allay the uncertainty expressed by a few

state courts."1 63 The rule also codified its rationale for authorizing
rather than compelling use of the due-on-sale clause by federal
159. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(d)-(g) (1977) (current version at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f)-(g)
(1981)).
160. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9 (1981).
161. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f) (1977) recodified at § 545.8-3(0 (1981).
162. 46 Fed. Reg. 39,123-39,124 (1981), amending 12 C.F.R. Part 556 (adding new
paragraph (f)),
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(0 (1981):
Part 556-Statements of Policy
Amend § 556.9 by adding a new paragraph (f0 thereto, to read as follows:
§ 556.9 Imposition of late charges and due-on-sale clauses.
(0Due-on-sale policy and Federal preemption. [1] Federal associations are
obliged to take reasonable precautions to protect themselves against the economic
risks associated with mortgage lending, including the risk that the cost of lendable
funds will exceed the yield from existing mortgage loans, and that sharply rising
interest rates will reduce substantially the value of existing mortgage assets. In this
connection, the Board has determined that the due-on-sale clause normally is a valuable and often an indispensable source of protection for the financial soundness of
Federal associations and for their continued ability to fund new home loan commitments. Consequently, the Board for many years has authorized due-on-sale clauses
for use by Federal associations. However, because the Board desires to afford associations the flexibility to accommodate special situations and circumstances, §
545.8-3(0 of this Subchapter by its terms merely authorizes rather than compels
the inclusion and exercise of due-on-sale clauses in mortgage loans.
[2] Paragraph (f)of § 545.8-3 confirms the continuing authority of Federal
associations to include due-on-sale clauses in their mortgage loan contracts and to
exercise such clauses, subject only to the express limitations contained in § 545.83(g). Due-on-sale practices of Federal associations shall be governed exclusively by
the Board's regulations, in preemption of and without regard to any limitations imposed by state law on either their inclusion or exercise including, but not confined
to, state law prohibitions against restraints on alienation, prohibitions against penalties and forfeitures, equitable restrictions and state law dealing with equitable
transfers.
163. 46 Fed. Reg. 39,123-39,124 (1981).
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associations. 164

On September 23, 1981, the Comptroller of the Currency proposed a rule that would authorize inclusion of due-on-sale clauses in
real estate loans made by national banks16 5 and make such clauses
fully enforceable notwithstanding contrary state law. 6 The rule
would also re-validate due-on-sale clauses in outstanding loans that
1 67
were impaired or questioned by court decisions or state statutes.

In the proposed rule, 1 8 the Comptroller concedes the battle as
to the use of the clause in mortgage loan contracts which were made,
assumed or transferred prior to the effective date of the regulations
and during a period when a state had a statute or judicial decision in
effect which rendered the clause invalid or unenforceable (the "window period"). This regulation, by preempting state law to the contrary, would resurrect dormant due-on-sale clauses in mortgages
which have been previously transferred and which could otherwise be
assumed in the future.16 9 Likewise, preemption would allow national
banks to enforce all new loans with due-on-sale clauses and older
1 70
loans which contain the clause but have never been transferred.
The Comptroller has also authorized the use of the clauses in
adjustable rate mortgage loans made by national banks.17 1 In answer

to certain courts' concern with disclosure and the ambiguous language of the due-on-sale provisions, 7 2 the issues of reasonableness
and consent are addressed by specific disclosure guidelines in the
regulations17 3 which require, inter alia, disclosure to the prospective
borrower regarding any prepayment fees and acceleration upon
transfer.17 4 Consumer disclosure is further required by the loan contract itself which must contain specific information about the as164. Id.
165.

46 Fed. Reg. 46,964 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 30 (1981)); see supra

note 6.
166.

46 Fed. Reg. 46,964 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 30 (1981)).

167. Id.
168. 46 Fed. Reg. at 46,966 (1981).
169. See id.
170. See id. The misconception that the proposed rule would mandate the use of the
due-on-sale clause in all national bank loans and that it would nullify the assumability of some
current mortgages, has fueled the negative comment on this issue and prompted the Comptroller to issue a clarification letter. [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 48, at B-2 (Dec. 7,
1981).
171. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932, 18,943-47 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 29.1-.10).
172. E.g., Silver v. Rochester Say. Bank, 73 A.D.2d 81, 84, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947 (4th
Dep't 1980).
173. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932, 18,944 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.8 (1981)).
174. Id. at 18,944-45 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(a)(7) (1981)).
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sumability of the loan if the bank wants 5to secure the option to exercise a due-on-sale clause at any time.'1
The FHLBB's new regulations on its adjustable mortgage loans
(AMLs)17 6 do not specifically mention use of due-on-sale clauses,
but the regulations do include a specific preemption provision 71 regarding any state law purporting to address or restrict the FS&Ls'
ability to make or participate in AML instruments. These regulations replace existing provisions regarding lenders' authority to issue
renegotiable rate mortgages (RRMs)178 and variable rate mortgages
(VRMs).117 The Board also deleted the requirement that FS&Ls offer a choice of a fixed rate mortgage to applicants who are eligible
for an alternative mortgage loan.180
The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), on July
22, 1981, also promulgated a final rule 81 designed to clarify its existing policy to require'1 2 due-on-sale clauses in its real estate loan
agreements. The exercise of the clause at the time of transfer is optional with the lender1 83 however, subject to similar specific exceptions as outlined in the FHLBB's due-on-sale provisions.'"
D. Proposed Federal Legislation
Senator Garn, of the Senate Banking Committee, has introduced legislation, 1s5 drafted by the chairman of the FHLBB, which
would greatly expand all FS&L practices to permit them to take
commercial deposits and make commercial loans.186 The bill would
allow FS&Ls, national banks and federal credit unions to use dueon-sale clauses in their mortgage loans.187
175. Id. at 18,944 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.7 (1981)).
176. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 545 (1981)).
177. Id. at 24,152 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(a)(2)).
178. 46 Fed. Reg. at 24,149 (1981) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(a) (1980)).
179. Id. (replacing 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(c) (1980)).
180. Id. (amending 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(a) (1980)).
181. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,676, 38,678 (1981) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6 (1980)); 12
C.F.R. § 701.21-6 (1981).
182. The FHLBB's final rule and the Comptroller's proposed rule allow but do not require the use of a due-on-sale clause.
183. 46 Fed. Reg. 38,676, 38,678 (1981); 12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6(d)(2) (1981).
184. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
185. S. 1703, 97 Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP.
(BNA) No. 40, at T-1 (Oct. 12, 1981) (Thrift Institutions Restructuring Act of 1981) (introduced by Sen. Garn on Oct. 5, 1981, at "request" of FHLBB and Administration).
186. [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 42, at A-18 (Oct. 26, 1981).
187. [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 40, at T-2 (Oct. 12, 1981).
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A second bill,188 also introduced by Senator Garn, is more expansive as to the powers of savings institutions, and would allow the
due-on-sale clause to be used by all federally-chartered institutions,
and state-chartered institutions whose deposits are covered under a
federal deposit insurance program.189
Either bill would preempt contrary state law. The second bill
seeks greater uniformity, however, as to state and federal lenders'
use of the due-on-sale clause.190 In addition, the purpose of introducing federal legislation to preempt state law was to clarify the authority of the three regulatory agencies' rules regarding due-on-sale, and
not to1 imply any present lack of agency authority to preempt state
19
law.
IV.

THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN NEW YORK

The due-on-sale clause first received judicial endorsement in
New York in 1970 in Stith v. Hudson City Savings Institution.1 "a In
Stith, the court upheld the due-on-sale clause and legitimized the
lender's protection of the mortgage portfolio as a reasonable justification for the acceleration. 19"The specific provision in the contract 1 "
required the saving institution's consent to allow assumption of the
mortgage. 19 When the borrowers conveyed the property to the
Stiths almost seven years later, the lender agreed to the transfer only
188. S. 1720, 97 Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act of 1981); see [July-Dec.] WAsH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 40, at A-16 to A-17 (Oct.
12, 1981).
189. See S. 1720, 97 Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
190. Telephone interview with Marie Giblin, Staff Member, Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 24, 1981) (regarding Proposed Rule dated Aug. 26, 1981 (46
Fed. Reg. 46,964 (1981)) [hereinafter cited as Giblin Interview]; see 50 U.S.L.W. 2220 (Oct.
13, 1981).
191. See Giblin Interview, supra note 190.
192. 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1970). The defendant was a statechartered savings institution.
193. Id. at 868, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
194. The clause read:
"In the event the obligors sell or convey the property which has been given as security for this bond, this obligation cannot be assumed without the consent in writing of
the mortgagee, and if said consent is withheld all sums due hereunder, both principal and interest, will become immediately due and payable."
Id. at 864, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 806 (quoting bond clause).
195. Although there was no reasonableness standard in the clause as to the granting of
consent, the original borrower, Kennedy, claimed that he had received assurance from the
independent mortgage servicing representative that "a lending institution would not withhold
its consent unreasonably if a financially qualfied person. . . agreed to assume the mortgage as
part of the purchase price." Id. at 864, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
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on the condition that the interest rate increase by one and one half
percent.196 The purchasers then brought the action seeking a declaratory judgment that the lender's action was illegal, basing their argument on a New York law which prohibited an interest increase
beyond the maximum rate authorized at the time the loan was
made.19 7 The court dismissed this argument, noting that the law only
prevents a lender from arbitrarily terminating loan agreements in
order to make "new" loans at higher rates, if such are in effect. The
court also observed that the law did not apply if the "accelerated
maturity of the loan results from the [borrower's] act or default,"1' 8
as was the situation given the borrowers' violation of the consent
clause in the contract. In its holding the court cited language from
Cherry v. Home Savings & Loan Association,'"9 which unquestioningly approved the lender's option to employ due-on-sale clauses as a
means of securing a "'higher return for the use of its money' "200
than obtained from the original borrowers, and held that such action
"'demonstrated no lack of good faith or fair dealing.' "2011 The court

also noted that the lender had "'no obligation to act only in a manner which others might term 'reasonable'.' "202
Seven years later, in Mutual Real Estate Investment Trust v.
Buffalo Savings Bank 2 0° 3 a New York court again upheld a due-onsale clause, this time in a commercial context. The borrower-plaintiff
was a real estate investment trust seeking to convey income-producing property to a purchaser of sound financial means. The borrower
sought to enjoin acceleration of the mortgage by the defendant savings bank 2 4 and a declaration that the bank's actions were unreasonable in light of the superior financial status of the purchaser. 0 5
196.

Id. at 865, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 807. The original borrowers had purchased the prop-

erty at 6% interest in October 1962. The bank sought an increase to 7 % in April 1969.
.197. Id. at 867, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 808-09 (construing N.Y. GEN. OBLIu. LAW § 5501(4)).
198.

Id. at 867, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (construing 3 N.Y.C.R.R. § 4.6).

199. Id. at 868, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 809-10 (citing Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n,
276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138-39 (1969)).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1977).
204. The defendant was a New York chartered savings bank. Id. at 676, 395 N.Y.S.2d

at 584.
205.

The parties disagreed as to whether the financial soundness of the purchaser had

been determined to the lender's full satisfaction. Both parties also contended that Pennsylvania
law should apply since the property was located in that state. Finding no Pennsylvania law on
point, the court presumed that the law there was the same as New York's law. It also noted
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Citing Stith, the court approved the Stith rationale for allowing the
lender to reappraise the desirability of the loan from the standpoint
of the value of the security covered and "'the interest rate obtainable in the current money market.' "206 The court did note that the
issue of mortgage foreclosure fell within the equity jurisdiction of the
court and indicated that there could be circumstances which would
render the lender's enforcement of a due-on-sale clause unconscionable. 207 The court held, however, that because the borrower had not
shown such unconscionable circumstances
the enforcement of the
208
clause did not constitute an inequity.
Such an inequitable situation did arise in Nichols v. Evans,20°
where the court refused to grant summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff-lenders who were not a lending institution but, apparently,
private individuals who were either purchase money mortgagees or
private investors. The lender had attempted to foreclose a mortgage
via a due-on-sale clause when the property's co-owners merely transferred the title to a corporate entity of which they were principals. 10
While citing Stith as the only New York authority on the subject, 211,
the court focused on the specific conduct of the defendants and recognized the equitable considerations relied on to avoid enforcement
of the clause in other jurisdictions "where the prevailing practice has
not been to compel forfeiture solely because a conveyance has taken
place contrary to a due-on-sale provision. 212 The court's reliance on
that, in light of its holding, the factual issue of the purchaser's financial soundness was not
relevant. 90 Misc. 2d at 677, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
206. Id. at 678, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 585-86 (citing Stith v. Hudson City Say. & Loan Inst.,
63 Misc. 2d 863, 866, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1970)).
207. 90 Misc. 2d at 678-79, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
208. Id.
209. 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. Duchess Cty. 1978).
210. The borrowers had made late payments on two earlier occasions which they attributed to their distraction over their daughter's death. They had also offered to cure their default
by a re-conveyance of the title back to themselves as individual owners. The conveyance to the
corporation had been made in March 1976, but the lenders did not seek enforcement of the
acceleration clause until after June 1977. Id. at 939-41, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28.
211. Id. at 940, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 427. The court later mentions dicta from the Buffalo
Savings Bank opinion which stated that "under certain circumstances, it may be inequitable to
enforce a due-on-sale provision." 92 Misc. 2d at 941, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 428 (citing Mut. Real
Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 678, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583, 586 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1977)).
212. 92 Misc. 2d at 940, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 428 (citing United States v. Angel, 362 F.
Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1973) which did not involve a due-on-sale clause but an attempted foreclosure for minor violations of health and safety codes, and citing Tucker v. Lassen Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974) which was heavily
relied on by the Wellenkamp court).
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other jurisdictions' authority to avoid an injustice in this case is understandable. The citation to cases 213 which do not allow acceleration unless the lender can show a threat to the security, however,
could be read as a step backwards from the Stith2 1 4 and Buffalo215
reasoning which recognized readjustment of the interest rate as another justification for due-on-sale acceleration.
The three lower court decisions in Stith, Buffalo and Nichols
were followed by a New York appellate decision in Silver v. Rochester Savings Bank. 16 The court, reversing the lower court, 217 held

that the defendant bank could not condition its approval of the property transfer on the new purchaser's acceptance of an increase in the
interest rate.2 18 The facts of the case2 " are pertinent, however, in
clarifying the court's rationale. The appellee savings bank 2 0 was
both the mortgagee and the lessee of the property owner.2 21 Also, the

bank had reserved first refusal rights to purchase the property but
decided not to meet the new purchaser's price, which was contingent
on the bank's allowing the assumption of the same interest rate.
Perhaps most important was the fact that the bank had agreed in the
due-on-sale provision that it would not unreasonably withhold its
consent to any term in the mortgage which required its approval. 8
Because the lender established its own standard of reasonableness 224 in the loan agreement and acknowledged that the proposed
213. E.g., Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725
(1972) (savings and loan not entitled to equitable relief absent a showing that lender's security
is threatened.); see also authorities cited supra note 68.
214. 63 Misc. 2d at 868, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 809-10.
215. 90 Misc. 2d at 678-80, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 586.
216. 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (4th Dep't 1980).
217. The lower court held that the defendant savings bank had the right to withhold
consent to the transfer. Id. at 86, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
218. Id. at 85, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
219. Id. at 82-83, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
220. The appellee bank was a state-chartered savings bank. Id. at 82, 424 N.Y.S.2d at
946.
221. 73 A.D.2d at 83, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
222. Id. at 82-83, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 946. The original interest rate, established in 1973,
was 8.5%. The bank sought an increase, upon transfer in 1979, to 10.5%. Id.
223. The mortgage terms provided:
"Should the Mortgagor transfer title to mortgaged premises . . . without first obtaining the written consent of Mortgagee . . . Mortgagee shall have the option to
declare the whole of the unpaid principal sum . . . due and payable.... [W]here
any of the terms. . . of this mortgage require the approval. . . or consent of Mortgagee. . . [it] shall not be unreasonably withheld...
Id. at 83, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 946 (emphasis added).
224. The clause in the mortgage in which the bank agreed not to unreasonably withhold
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purchaser was financially sound,225 the court ruled that the intention
in placing such a due-on-sale provision in the agreement was to protect its security interest, and not to raise the interest rate at transfer. 26 It therefore granted summary judgment in favor of the
borrower. 227
While the court confined its holding to the contractual terms
peculiar to this case, its reasoning in regard to the equity investment
of the landowner and the reduced investment return of the purchaser
if a higher rate was allowed, could foreshadow a shift to the consumer-oriented 228 reasoning of Wellenkamp and its progeny. 22 The
court did comment, in a footnote, that if the bank had expressly provided for the right to raise the rate of interest, "a different question
would be presented" 230 due to the notice thereby given to the borrower. The court further noted that "there is authority that the [dueon-sale] provision, exercised in good faith, would be valid. 23 1
Although this case could be viewed as confined to its own special facts, the court's discussion of the equitable issues in due-on-sale
controversies, albeit in dicta, could also signal a "predisposition
against the use of a due-on[-sale] clause for interest rate adjustment
purposes. '232 If so, the stability of the due-on-sale clause in New
York may wash away in the sweeping tide of the Wellenkamp
reasoning.
The fate of a due-on-sale clause in a mortgage loan made by a
federally-chartered savings and loan association, however, was recently determined by a lower New York court. In FirstFederalSavings & Loan Association of Rochester v. Jenkins,23 the court,
granting summary judgment, upheld the FS&L's enforcement of a
due-on-sale provision in a 1978 mortgage loan agreement. Recognizing the preemptive nature of the federal regulations on this issue, the
consent was the fatal flaw. The court noted that where due-on-sale clauses had been upheld in
other jurisdictions, there had never been such a clause in the agreement. Conversely, courts
that had restricted the lender's use of the due-on-sale clause had done so by implying just such
a duty to act reasonably. Id. at 86, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
225. Id. at 83, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 946-47.
226. Id. at 86, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 948.

227. Id.
228. See supra text accompanying note 72.
229. See cases cited supra note 67-68.
230. 73 A.D.2d at 84 n.2, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 947 n.2.
231. Id.

232. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 158, at 305.
233. 109 Misc. 2d 715, 441 N.Y.S.2d 373 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins Cty. 1981).
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court ruled that such regulations applied to the facts therein. 4
While the court dismissed the defendants' claim that New York law
should apply, it noted that the clause was generally enforceable
under New York law and that the New York legislature had "obliquely recognized" the validity of the clause. 35
V. ECONOMIC ISSUES AND DuE-ON-SALE
Although the economic and legal issues are complex, there are
several observations that can be made about the economic impact of
the due-on-sale clause on today's housing market.2 38 Buyers and sellers benefit from assumability of interest rates and limiting the dueon-sale clause's enforcement, but this benefit is at the expense of the
lenders and the general home finance market.2 3 When the loan to
value ratio 23 8 is sufficient to cover the risk of transfer to an even less
financially secure buyer than the original borrower, it is less reasonable to enforce a due-on-sale clause using only a security risk rationale. 23 9 Likewise, even under most mortgage transfer agreements,
the original purchaser remains liable on the note obligation in the
event of default by the second purchaser. 4 In addition, the inmortgages offers greater protection and
creased use of insurance for
24 1
lender.
the
to
lower risk
The Wellenkamp 242 reasoning suggests that lenders should accurately forecast future interest rates or bear the expense of their
inaccuracy. This view, however, ignores the market practice on
which lenders rely with regard to the expected turnover rate of loans
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 722-23, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (citations omitted).
Id. at 724, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 379 (citations omitted).
See generally, Finch, supra note 55.
OFFICE OF HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, OFFICE

OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT & RESEARCH, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CONFER-

ENCE REPORT (1980) at 5-6 [hereinafter cited as HUD STUDY].

238. The loan to value ratio is the ratio of the balance of the loan principal to the value
of the property. Since the lender always has a right of foreclosure against the property in the
event the mortgagors default, a low loan to value ratio helps assure the lender of a sale price
high enough to cover the loan balance.
239. Comment, supra note 10, at 482. The author suggested that a court consider a safe
security ratio for the lender to lie somewhere between 60% and below (i.e. the outstanding
debt would not be greater than 60% of the market value of the house), given the fact that, at a
judicial foreclosure sale, the property is often sold for less than the full market value. Id.
240. See G. OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 249, 252.

241. Comment, supra note 10, at 484.
242. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379 (1978).
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every seven to ten years. 43 Judicial willingness to set aside contractual provisions espouses an attitude that economic market solutions
Such action has prompted the observation that
are inadequate.
there is no indication of judicial balancing of the interests involved,
nor any "appreciation of the forces at work in the markets. Unfortunately, however, the underlying problems which prompted the invocation of the clause in the first instance will not stay indefinitely
under the rug where the court swept them. 24 5
Also, the judicial implication that the use of the due-on-sale
clause by lenders is a form of economic duress is misplaced. 246 The
2 47
criticism that the clause is an unreasonable restraint on alienation
likewise fails to distinguish reasonable restraints that can be removed by private agreement from those that cannot.2 48 The due-onsale clause only "shifts to the [lender] the advantage from the increase 49in interest rates which would otherwise belong to the
'2
seller.
In 1979 FS&Ls had almost half of their mortgage portfolios
outstanding at an interest rate of less than nine percent while receiving interest of twelve percent or more on only five percent of their
mortgages.2 50 This situation requires state and federal savings and
243.

See Dunham v. Ware Say. Bank,

-

Mass. _

.,

423 N.E.2d 998, 1001

(1981):
[A]ithough mortgage loans are generally written for terms of twenty-five to thirty-

five years, the average homeowner does not remain in one residence until his mortgage is repaid. In fact, figures submitted by [saving banks' associations] tend to
establish that mortgages originating in the 1960's remained outstanding on the aver-

age from 6.5 to 9.8 years. Id.
244.

See Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal,18 J. L. & ECON. 293, 294

(1975).
245.

Bartke & Tagaropulos, supra note 15, at 1001 (footnote omitted). For the point of

view that courts should not treat inequality of bargaining power as a single justification for an
economic duress defense, see Ogilvie, Economic Duress, Inequality of BargainingPower and
Threatened Breach of Contract, 26 McGILL L.J. 289, 312-19 (1981).

246. See Epstein, supra note 244, at 313. This commentator has drawn a distinction
between the defense of duress where the circumstances involve actual "'duress of goods'" or
duress of consent from "economic duress" where "if A does not like B's offer, he can reject it."
The true defense of duress does not "turn upon the reasonableness of the terms of the agreement; nor. . . upon the market position of the parties to it immediately before it was formed."
Id. at 296. Hence, "'[e]conomic duress' is not a simple generalization of the common law
notions of duress, it is their repudiation. The integrity of the law of contract can be preserved
only if that notion is flatly and fully rejected." Id. at 297.
247.

E.g., Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 640, 526 P.2d 1169,

1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 (1974).
248. Epstein, supra note 244, at 312.
249. Id.
250.

See Roessner & Nagle, Asset-Liability Management for Savings and Loans, 14

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss4/10

32

Kreicher: Much Ado about Due-on-Sale: Avoiding the Tempest in New York
19821

DUE-ON-SALE

loans to reassess their market strategies to avoid the "flawed strategy" of borrowing short and lending long.251 Richard Pratt, chairman of the FHLBB, has advised that "the [FS&L] industry is in
danger of losing $5 billion dollars this year and 'can no longer afford
to subsidize homebuyers.' "252
Banking deregulation 253 has increased the vulnerability of savings and loan associations by removing interest deposit ceilings and
other insulating regulations.2 54 "[T]hrifts have been forced into the

competitive short term market for deposits [while] encumbered by
portfolios with long term low interest rate loans. '25
" This especially
affects state chartered S&Ls in states where due-on-sale enforcement has been limited 256 because, although challenged in many
states, FS&Ls are better protected by the FHLBB's regulations
which do allow use of the clause. One other consideration is the restriction placed on secondary market agencies 57 such as the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) by the lack of state uniformity in regard to the enforceability of the due-on-sale clauses. 58
FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD. J., July 1981, at 25, 27 (chart 2).
251. Ready & Ranelli, The Strategic Planning Challenge for Savings and Loans, 14
FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD. J., July 1981, at 15, 17.
252. Remarks of Richard Pratt, Chairman of the FHLBB, at National Press Club

Luncheon, Sept. 10, 1981, reported in [July-Dec.]

WASH.

FIN.

REP.

(BNA) No. 36, at A-19

to -21 (Sept. 14, 1981).
253. See [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 31, at AA-1 (Aug. 3, 1981) (report
on legislation allowing banks, S&Ls, and credit unions to issue "All Savers" certificates which
earn interest at rate equal to 70% of one-year Treasury bill rate); [July-Dec.] WASH. FIN.
REP. (BNA) No. 49, at A-22 (Dec. 14, 1981) (deposit rate regulations could leave S&Ls
stuck with portfolios of low yielding mortgages while being forced to pay higher rates to retain
deposits).
254. HUD STUDY, supra note 237, at 8.
255. Id.
256. E.g., authorities cited supra notes 67-70 and statutes cited supra notes 79-86, 8992.
257. The agencies in the secondary mortgage markets buy mortgages from savings and
loans to pool for resale to private investors, generating mortgage money for savings and loans
to finance more residential loans. G. OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 314.
258. HUD STUDY, supra note 237, at 6. Since the shorter the mortgage period the
greater the value of the mortgage for sale in the secondary market, the policy of FNMA is to
require acceleration of the principal at transfer of the property via due-on-sale clauses. FNMA
will only purchase mortgages that have a 7-year call provision in states that limit due-on-sale
enforcement. As of January 1981, FNMA required this provision in 17 states including New
York and California. Id. at 29.
A call-in provision in a mortgage can have adverse effects on the original borrower when
the lender, at the end of the call-in period, requires repayment of the principal and refinancing.
See N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981, at B3, col. 3. A New York savings bank called in fifty mortgage
loans, written in 1976 at 8.5%, offering to refinance at 15% for one year. Although the borrow-
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One study has concluded that due-on-sale mortgage clauses
should neither be prohibited nor required. 9 Instead, borrowers and
lenders should bargain for mutually acceptable terms which may or
may not include the clause. ° While it has been suggested that the
whole issue of due-on-sale may fade as alternative mortgage instruments become more common, 2 1 dismissal of the issue would be premature. Because the great majority of currently outstanding loans
are the fixed-rate type, 62 with an average turnover rate of seven to
ten years, 26 3 the due-on-sale clause remains a potential thorn in the
side of many lenders and borrowers.
The interest rate established for a fixed-rate mortgage reflects
the cost of the lender's assumption of the risk that interest rates will
rise during the life of the loan. 2" This may require an increased rate
premium which, not unlike the premiums paid for life or accident
insurance, is based on the lender's assessment of the risk. 65 When
the indicators and the perception of the risk are low, the fixed-rate
mortgage is a viable lending arrangement for both lender and borrower.26 6 When the risk is high, the cost may be too high for the
average home borrower.26 In this situation, the variable rate arrangements are seen as the only viable alternative.26 s The abandonment of fixed-rate loans, however, in favor of the more flexible mortgage arrangements, should not be regarded as the only solution to
the continued survival of the housing finance industry.269 The dueon-sale clause helps to equalize the cost of mortgages so that future
borrowers will not face higher interest rates-or forfeit the opportunity to make a fixed-rate loan-in order to subsidize holders of older,
ers were aware of the clause in the contract when the loan was made, they gambled that rates
would be the same or lower in 1981, when the loans were scheduled to be called. Id.
259. HUD STUDY, supra note 237, at 2.
260. Id.
261. See G. OSBORNE, supra note 1, at 307.
262. Id. at 670.
263. See supra note 243.
264. See Winger, Is The Fixed Rate Mortgage Obsolete?, 14 FED. HOME LOAN BANK
BD. J., Oct. 1981, at 14, 14-16.

265. Id. at 16.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See Id.
269. See id. One prediction describes a market where S&Ls are replaced by mortgage
mutual funds as the nation's leading lenders of residential mortgage money. While these funds
may be available at competitively priced interest rates, the investors would retain an equity
interest in all mortgages. E. Cox, BANKER'S DESK REFERENCE, 1981 YEARBOOK 33 (1981)
(citing Michael Evans, a leading econometrician).
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low-rate loans.
Consumers and lenders alike have been caught in what has been
described as a "silent revolution" that is providing a sharply different environment for financial institutions in the 1980s.110 As their
own sophistication increases about the rate of return on their personal investments, characterized by greater willingness to shift funds
out of passbook accounts for greater yields elsewhere, 71 consumers
must also be willing to take a more realistic approach to the investment lending practices of banks and other lending institutions. Judicial intervention on behalf of the consumer 272 in the context of the
due-on-sale controversy, except in limited inequitable situations,
retards the functioning of the economic market and represents a
shortsighted viewpoint inconsistent with the market realities of the
1980s.
VI. A

PROPOSAL FOR STATE AND FEDERAL UNIFORMITY

Although judicial acceptance of the enforceability of the dueon-sale clause in New York is still the general rule, its enforceability
and stability may be undermined by the potential for expansion of
the limited factual exceptions in Nichols 73 and Silver.274 Particularly in the area of commercial lending, where New York enjoys national prominence as a financial center, the stability of the due-onsale clause is necessary to allow lenders to plan long-term investment
strategies and execute mortgage contracts which will be upheld, barring evidence of true duress or other unconscionable terms.
Moreover, the evolving era of alternative mortgage instruments
need not portend the demise of the fixed-rate mortgage, as this is
clearly a reasonable and desirable form of financing a home, 75 par270. Ready & Ranelli, supra note 251, at 16.
271. This phenomenom, called "disintermediation," also occurs when depositors fail to
deposit funds at all in the traditional "passbook" type accounts, opting instead for higher
yields in less traditional accounts or for more disposable income. According to the FHLBB,
"Americans withdrew a record $25.5 billion dollars more than they put into savings and loan
associations last year [1981]. At the same time, savings and loans-the primary source of
home mortgages-closed only $52.1 billion in home loans in 1981, the lowest level since
1974." N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1982, at D5, col. 2.
272. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1978).
273. 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. 1978).
274. 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (4th Dep't 1980).
275. In fact, two commentators recently examined the FHLBB's and the Office of
Comptroller of the Currency's new regulations on alternative mortgage instruments and concluded that "despite the intent of the regulations, the borrower is not well protected from
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ticularly for homebuyers seeking long-term stability or who anticipate a decline in income in later years. While the use of a fixed-rate
mortgage may require a higher cost to the borrower to offset the
increased risk to the lender, the due-on-sale clause will help to ensure that fixed-rate mortgages remain an available choice for the
homebuyer. As homeowners participate more in arranging the creative financing of their own homes, their own financial self-interest
may warrant the use of a due-on-sale clause in their own financing
agreements with the purchaser. Likewise, a state bank or savings
and loan association's decision to forego use of the due-on-sale clause
in either a fixed-rate or alternative mortgage can then be based on
competitively bargained-for terms rather than on its fortuitous location in a state where the clause is in current disfavor.
Preemption by the due-on-sale regulations for FS&Ls, national
commercial banks, and federal credit unions appears to be a foregone conclusion,2 76 at least as to loans made after the effective dates
of the applicable regulations. 2 Assuming the proposed national legislation 27 8 does not, at the moment, expressly preempt other stateregulated lending institutions, this leaves the due-on-sale clause at
the mercy of the state courts or legislatures in several areas: (1) dueon-sale clauses in FS&L mortgages made before June 1976;279 (2)
due-on-sale clauses in national bank mortgages made before the effective date of the final regulations now in proposal form;2 0 (3) dueon-sale clauses used in mortgages made by other lending institutions
which are not otherwise covered by current or pending federal legislation;2 81 (4) due-on-sale clauses used in commercial mortgages
outside of the purview of the federal agencies;282 and (5) due-on-sale
clause options which may be available to non-institutional private individual or group lenders in either residential or commercial
settings.218
The New York legislature should enact a clear law for statecertain increases and may be ill-advised to utilize these loan instruments in financing the
purchase of a single-family home." Iezman and Hoffman, The Adjustable Rate Mortgage and
the Adjustable Mortgage Loan: The Effect of Unlimited Interest Rate Adjustments In Residential Home Loans, I INr'L PROP. INV. J. 121, 123 (1982).
276. See supra notes 148-49, 158-84 and accompanying text; see infra note 287.
277. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (1981); supra discussion in notes 158-84.
278. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 131-35, 148-52, 158-70 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 192-232.
282. See, e.g., supra notes 56-65 and cases cited.
283. Id.
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chartered and state supervised lending that will uphold the contractual effect of the due-on-sale clause in lending agreements without
requiring its use. This legislation could also provide clearly enumerated equitable exceptions such as those contained in the regulation of
the FHLBB.2 s" The legislature should adopt a standard of reasonableness as to the consent of the lender for waiver or enforcement of
the due-on-sale clause that allows readjustment of interest rates as
an acceptable justification for enforcement. This rate change could
be tied to certain indices such as the FNMA secondary mortgage
index, so that a lender could not demand an interest rate greater
than the prevailing market rate.
While section 254-a of the New York Real Property Law285 impliedly sanctions the use of the due-on-sale clause, it does not do so
directly. The section merely precludes a lender's assessment of a prepayment fee on the borrower when the lender has also denied consent for a new purchaser to assume the existing interest rate. Perhaps this waiver of the prepayment fee could be mandated in
situations where the lender does not desire a change in interest rate
at transfer, due to a decrease in the prevailing rate, but the purchaser desires to refinance the loan. In that situation, the purchaser
will always seek the lower rate and the original borrower will be
forced to repay the remaining principal earlier than called for in the
loan contract.
While this state capitulation to federal banking practices could
be viewed as undermining the dual banking system with a correspending switch to national regulation, the movement toward nationwide banking markets and deregulation mark some inevitable decline
in a bank's attachment to its home state.28 6 The New York legislature can take steps to better protect the interests of all parties to the
mortgage agreement-lender, borrower, new purchasers and the
public-by more precisely formulated statutes regarding the due-onsale clause's use and abuse, and thereby join the growing resolve of
federal lenders toward enforceability of due-on-sale clauses. Such
legislation, applicable to all state institutional lenders, will avoid a
lack of uniformity between the federal and state regulated banking
systems.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 106-11.
285. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 254-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
286. See the excellent discussion of the legal recognition of interstate banking and the
growing federalism in banking in Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HorsTrA L. REV. 1133,
1368-71 (1981).
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CONCLUSION

A misguided preoccupation with consumer protection has moved
the judiciary to deal a serious blow to the due-on-sale clause. Welldrafted legislation is the best solution to avoid its demise in New
York lending markets. A case-by-case disposition is inefficient and
presents too many different situations for a clear and stable rule to
emerge from judicial intervention. In order to preserve the stability
of the residential and commercial real estate markets, lenders and
borrowers must be able to rely on the terms of their mortgage contracts. A borrower should not be permitted to disaffirm the terms of
a mortgage contract without a clear showing of fraud or duress.
The use of the due-on-sale clause makes good economic sense,
not only in the fixed rate mortgage but in the newer variable rate
contracts as well. Those lending institutions that have traditionally
provided the funds for home mortgage financing are entering a new
era of banking practices that will provide them greater opportunities
for investment in non-traditional areas. Unless mortgage lending
practices are allowed to keep pace with the economic realities of the
1980s, consumers, naively "protected" by courts and legislatures,
will find themselves out in the cold. 8
Linda L. Kreicher
287. As this note went to press, the United States Supreme Court decided the due-onsale preemption issue in Fidelity FederalSavings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta, 50
U.S.L.W. 4916 (U.S. June 29, 1982) (No. 81-750). See supra text accompanying notes 10044. The Court reversed the California Court of Appeal's holding that Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978), was controlling and that
California law was not preempted by the FHLBB's regulations on the subject of due-on-sale
clauses. See supra text accompanying notes 23-65.
The Supreme Court, in a 6-2 decision, held in de la Cuesta that the FHLBB's regulation
did preempt conflicting state limitations on the use of due-on-sale clauses and, therefore,
barred application of the Wellenkamp rule to federal savings and loan associations. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, recognized the FHLBB's plenary authority under the
Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976 & Supp. IV), to regulate the
savings and loan associations in accordance with the "best practices" necessary to protect their
financial stability. de la Cuesta, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4921. According to the Court, the Board's
decision not to compel use of the due-on-sale clauses in its mortgage agreements did not affect
its "unambiguous" intention to preempt state due-on-sale restrictions that undermine the
Board's flexibility "to adjust a long-term mortgage's interest rate towards current market
rates." Id. at 4919-20. While the Court's preemption decision settles the due-on-sale issue for
federal savings and loan associations, it does not impact directly on the due-on-sale restrictions
imposed by states on state-chartered lending institutions or on national banks that are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency. See supra note 6; see supra notes 165-75 and accompanying text. The Court's decision lends further support, however, to this note's argument
for statutory authorization of due-on-sale clauses in New York and other states, in order to
allow state-chartered lending institutions to remain economically competitive with federal
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lenders. Further, legislative endorsement of the due-on-sale clause's use by state-chartered savings and loans (SS&Ls) will help to curtail the SS&Ls' tendency to switch from state to
federal charters in order to take advantage of more favorable lending regulations.
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